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their attempts to argue that Marx is 'scientific', by which
they mean respectable and elevated above the comprehension
of ordinary mortals, academic Marxists ignore his frequent
use of Charles Fourier, the French utopian theorist and writer
of biting satires and crazy proposals. Aged 17 when the French
Revolution turned his world on its head, Fourier spent his
life expanding on the possibilities thrown up by that momentous
event, and excoriating the banality of the bourgeois and mercantile
exploitation of its new freedoms. If Fourier has an equivalent
today, it's Stewart Home, tireless writer of scurrilous pamphlets
and anti-novels consisting of political tirades, jokes and
pointed plagiarism. The dialectical method is in its nature
humorous, because it senses hierarchy and repression whenever
certain abstractions are declared sacrosanct and fixed. Dialectical
reflection on concepts becomes so avid - so desirous of ideological
fluidity - that it must acknowledge the contingency of the
reader's relationship to the text, and so brings to consciousness
the historical and temporary nature of the terms being used.
This is what brings Marx into the orbit of great literature.
In Karl Marx and the Iroquois, a pamphlet currently available
at Housmans Bookshop on the Caledonian Road, Franklin Rosemont
says:
Wasn't it under the sign of poetry, after all, that Marx
came to recognise himself as an emnemy of the bourgeois
order? Everyone knows the famous 'three components' of Marxism:
German philosophy, English economics and French socialism.
But what about the poets of the world: Aeschylus and Homer,
Shakespeare and Cervantes, Goethe and Shelley? To miss this
fourth compenent is to miss a lot of Marx (and indeed, a
lot of life). A whole critique of post-Marx Marxism could
be based on this calamitous 'oversight'. [Arsenal #4, Black
Swan Press, 1989]
In 1844, it is true, Marx gave up his personal literary
aspirations and devoted his time to a study of economics.
This was because he reckoned a criticism of how capitalism
explains itself to itself - political economy - would be
more devastating than any volume of poems or comic novel.
Yet Rosemont rightly sets Marx's Capital next to Fourier's
New Amorous World, the poetry of Isidore Ducasse, and Marcel
Duchamp's Green Box as 'works that come down to us with
question-marks blazing like sawn-off shotguns, scattering
here, there and everywhere sparks that illuminate our own
restless search for answers'. Capital was subtitled 'a critique
of political economy', but it was a singular work which
blew apart the discipline by the introduction of dialectical
philosophy and communist politics; in the preface to the
second edition Marx talks about how German philosophers
deemed it 'outlandish'. Outlandish indeed: it was the work
of a political refugee, or as we say today, an asylum seeker.
I'm aware that many serious left politicos will characterise
Franklin Rosemont, a Chicago surrealist, as somewhat 'outlandish'
himself, but that seems to me to ignore one of the great
strengths of Marxism, which is its proposal of a lifetime
of reading and study unhampered by the requirements of either
academy or commerce. Capital is such an original combination
of different intellectual and political traditions, it could
never have been written at the behest of any established
institution. It's utterly a product of bohemian resistance
to class society. To read the work of some academic Marxists,
you'd never think Marx polemicised versus official thinking.
The learned men by profession, guild or privilege, the
doctors and others, the colourless university writers of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with their stiff
pigtails and their distinguished pedantry and their petty
hair-splitting dissertations, interposed themselves between
the people and the mind, between life and science, between
freedom and mankind. It was the unauthorised writers who
created our literature. ['Debates on the Freedom of the
Press', 1842, Collected Works, London: Lawrence & Wishart,
1975, Vol. 1, p. 178]
The academic division of labour, in which a thinker cannot
be taken seriously until he or she 'chooses' a discipline
and sticks to it, wreaks havoc on attempts to understand
the social and cosmic totality. This is acknowledged by
Marxists, but it doesn't prevent them echoing the distinctions
between economics and poetry, science and art, which are
imposed by the academy. As a surrealist, Rosemont isn't
simply trying to aestheticise Marx: he also subscribes to
a tradition that is fiercely critical of the role of art
under capitalism.
In a polemical volume issued in 1956, Pierre Naville, surrealist
and one of the founders of the Trotskyist Fourth International,
inveighed against Jean-Paul Sartre. Like the Situationists
in later years, Naville detested Sartre's vacillations over
Stalinism - his role as 'fellow-traveller'. In November
1956, reeling from the fact that the Soviet Union had sent
in tanks and troops to suppress the Hungarian workers revolt,
probably killing 30,000 people, Sartre was distancing himself
from the Communist Party. Naville found this stance hypocritical,
since Sartre now seemed to have forgotten that he had once
been an enthusiastic supporter of Stalin. He also objected
to Sartre's self-definition as a 'communist intellectual',
saying:
Do you imagine that Marx imagined himself an 'intellectual'
communist? No, he called himself a communist, which is something
else entirely. The intelligentsia exchanges the right everyone
has of using their intelligence for entrée to that
celestial realm, that of the 'intelligent' class. By so
doing, they think they're elevating themselves, and giving
themselves a glorious social role, but actually they just
betray themselves as Marxists, and become a clique of servile
functionaries. (L'Intellectuel Communiste (A propos de Jean-Paul
Sartre), Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie,
1956, p. 11.
This is why Marx matters to artists: he saw through the
rewards offered to so-called 'spiritual' or 'intellectual'
activity under capitalism, and saw that so-called success
is simply an index of serving the system. This explains
why creative artistic and intellectual activity in the twentieth-century
has been a series of revolts versus what the situationists
called 'recuperation': the buying up of artistic labour
as a commodity.
If artistic activity is only judged in the Charles Saatchi
or Sarah Kent sense, as the provision of objects for capital
investment, then Marx's radicak critique will appear philistine
and anti-cultural. However, Marx believed in a radically
democratic aesthetic: a judgment of civilization, not in
terms of its architecture or the objects in its art galleries
and museums, but in terms of the lives that may be lived
in it. His criticism of the money form was that, by reducing
everything to commodities and the rationalised pursuit of
profit, it produced global competition and war. Towards
the end of his life Marx made extensive notes on Lewis Henry
Morgan's anthropological study Ancient Society, noting that
the Iroquois had democratic assembles 'where every adult
male and female member had a voice upon all questions brought
before it'. He noted that it was private property which
allowed the emergence of a privileged caste. As Rosemont
argues in his essay, it is only the Stalinist travesty of
Marxism which makes capitalism an 'inevitable' stage in
the history of humanity, and holds we can learn nothing
from 'backward people'. Rosemont quotes Marx's extensive
notes on tobacco-smoking rituals, showing that his critique
of Christianity didn't come from a soulless rationalism,
but aversion to its sexist and repressive metaphysics. Marx's
profound historical sense meant that he could understand
practises his contemporaries dismissed as 'savage' as materialist
recognition of natural abundance and solar energy. Marx
matters for artists because he can help explain why so much
of what they do - in fact the best part of what they do
- resists the logic of the commodity, and is regularly criticised
as mad, bad and mystical: premonitions of new ways of living
beyond commodity illusions.
It is frequently the case that criticism of practises or
ideas actually stems from the conceptual limitations of
the aggressor rather than any fault in what's being criticised.
Psychoanalysis has been particularly perceptive about this,
for example exposing the latent homsexuality of bigotry
towards gays, or the psychotic displays of sex-obsession
by campaigners against pornography and paedophilia. The
same tic can be seen in criticisms of Marx. If artists are
told that Marx might matter to them, a common retort is
the conventional one that Marx reduced everything to economics,
and therefore has no time for mental or spiritual values.
This charge is backed up by vaguely-remembered images of
grim barrack-housing for workers in Communist Russia, and
the lack of availability of consumer and recreational goods.
Actually, the whole of Capital was written to show that
the attempt to make 'economics' a mathematical science was
doomed to failure: exchanges involving money give an illusion
of equal exchange to transactions which are in fact coercions
by social power. The end of the postwar boom and the growing
inqualities created by global capitalism have proved Marx's
theory right: the market doesn't even things out, it produces
situations where people end up losing their lives whilst
collecting cockles for one pound an hour.
But what place does Capital have for artistic production?
To begin at the beginning, I want to look at the opening
of Capital in order to see how Marx's scurrilous, irreverent,
profane, indecent, body-based materialism copes with explaining
the production of commodities. Is it actually an attack
on 'spiritual values' in favour of 'economics', a macho
insistence on 'hard facts' about the means of production
versus intangible consumer fantasy?
Significantly, far from asserting objective economic fact
versus subjective fancy, Capital begins with acknowledgement
of the driving role 'fancy' - what he calls Phantasie in
the German - plays in economics.
A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us,
a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of
some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether,
for instance, they spring from the stomach (`Magen') or
from fancy (`Phantasie'), makes no difference.
In order to back up this assertion, Marx cites from Nicholas
Barbon's A Discourse on Coining the New Money Lighter, In
Answer to Mr Locke's `Considerations' from 1696. The fact
that the quality of bourgeois political economy decayed
over time, descending from science to apology - William
Petty, John Locke, Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus are treated
with diminishing respect - was part of Marx's polemic.
Marx quotes Barbon as saying:
Desire implies want; it is the appetite of the mind, and
as natural as hunger to the body ... The great number (of
things) have their value from supplying the wants of the
mind.
Saying that the mind, too, has `wants' crosses the wires
of soul/body dualism. In Plato and St Paul the soul partakes
of the divine, is eternal, and therefore has no 'wants'.
Marx's citation of anglo-bourgeois materialism was a calculated
affront to Christian residues in German philosophy. Rather
than something to which the philosophical mind should remain
aloof, the nascent bourgeois economy and its stimulation
of artificial needs (`Phantasie') was praised.
Barbon gave examples of the `wants of the mind':
Such as all sorts of fine draperies, gold, silver, pearl,
diamonds and all sorts of precious stones. They are used
to adorn and deck the body. They are badges of riches, and
serve to make distinctions of preference amongst men.
Marx points out that for commodity production there are
no `false' needs: fantasy is just as much grist to the economic
mill as bodily needs.
As against Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant, who saw an impermeable
barrier between things and ideas, Marx understood human
beings as productive, hence he recognised the part that
fantasy plays in the creation of commodities. Thus human
desire isn't removed from his analysis of capitalism, it's
put at its heart. If it's true that capitalism has harnessed
our desires to its murderous system, then our desiring natures
require transformation as well as the system of distribution
which feeds them. Our desiring natures are in fact ourselves
as productive human beings.
Asger Jorn, the Danish painter who helped found the Situationists,
attempted to develop a materialist aesthetics based on Darwin,
Marx and Freud, one which could explain a role for art.
He said:
It is precisely fascinations, their elaboration and interplay,
that are the artist's special area. [The Natural Order,
Report No 1 of the Scandinavian Institute of Comparative
Vandalism, 1962, p. 63]
When Stewart Home initiated the Art Strike between 1990-1993,
many people saw it as an absurd piece of self-promotion.
In some ways it was. Nevertheless, the blunt way in which
Home faced issues which most art critics have become too
sophisticated to do more than yawn over - commodification,
recuperation, serving the system - generated leaflets, pamphlets
and eventually novels which are far above the level of most
artworld productions. Home's Marxism has developed as he's
found time to read Amadeo Bordiga, Hegel and Marx himself.
Home's polemics in artworld debates have been convincing
because he speaks from the same position as Pierre Naville
- a refusal to credit a celestial realm of culture which
is removed from the average needs of the average person.
However, there's one need which cannot by assuaged by the
commodity system, and one which keeps driving Home into
issuing more and more ludicrous texts. That is the need
to understand what our desires actually are. His latest
Down & Out in Shorditch & Hoxton [London, Do-Not
Press, 2004] is a parody of a tart's memoirs which mixes
literary criticism, porn and plagiarism of eighteenth-century
texts in a manner that's both tantalizing and upsetting.
It's a rare example of art which has a Marxist dimension
because nothing in it substitutes for the desire for proletarian
revolution: in this it resembles Samuel Beckett, but Home's
politics is clearer, graphic like punk, there's no existential
posturing or 'style'. Or at least the 'style' is so degraded
and second-hand, it holds no art glamour.
Personally, I can only actively engage in politics if I
can do so on the basis of Marxism - I need to be in a revolutionary
party because I want genuine democratic dialogue about what's
to be done, and for me Marxism provides the only bullshit-free
analysis of what capitalism does to us. However, the fact
that Marx is difficult to read means that his texts can
become the preserve of a political leadership who then pamper
a membership with readymade notions. I accept that a degree
of this will always be necessary in a party which seeks
non-intellectual members. But the struggle for Marxism doesn't
stop once you've formed a party, it starts. I think Home's
novels - and the disorientation provided by pertinent Modern
Art - can help develop a popular Marxism: sceptical, undogmatic,
courageous in making judgments. Because Marx is the left's
preeminent radical writer, it doesn't mean that he should
be the only one whose radicalism is effective in the grain
of his texts.
In his review of my own novel Shitkicks & Doughballs
(London; Spare Change Books, 2003) in Radical Philosophy
#124, the poet Ian Patterson praised it by dissing Home's
work. He said:
The penumbra of self-justifying argument that surrounds
Home's glib production of consciously trashy, free-association
occult-porno novels of post-punk social critique is marginally
more interesting than the actual experience of reading them.
I think Patterson read an early book by Home like Defiant
Pose (London: Peter Owen, 1989) or Pure Mania (Edinburgh:
Polygon, 1989), rather bleak parodies of Richard Allen skinhead
novels, made up his mind, and therefore hasn't opened books
like 69 Things To Do With a Dead Princess (Edinburgh: Canongate,
2002): or Down & Out in Shoreditch & Hoxton (London:
Do-Not Press, 2004) ... or indeed, my way into appreciating
Home, the critique of Green Anarchism where by dint of a
wicked need to expose the middleclass nature of anarchist
'extremism', he turned himself into a Marxist. My own mild
entertainment, a novelisation of my theory book Art, Class
& Cleavage, was designed as an encouragment for revolutionary
thinking, but it lacks the utter disdain Home has for middle-class
literary values, and the radical laughter opened up by this
disdain.
When you read Home you're made to feel absurd yourself,
which is not quite the same thing as enjoying absurdity.
The process is not 'enjoyable' in the commodity sense of
having a 'stomach' or 'fantasy' need fulfilled, but you
become conscious of these drives: you can feel your consciousness
of self - and the activity called reading - grow. You become
aware of the limits of a 'good read' or a 'fine novel'.
Even though this is 'unpolitical' in the sense that Home
is not exhorting you to adopt a particular political option,
this method of inculcating reader-consciousness is actually
very Marxist. Whereas Booker-Prize novels deflect the reader
from their essentially middleclass and trivial worldpictures
by allowing the superior reader to feel sorry for certain
selected global unfortunates, Home pushes you to revolutionary
recognition of the limits of commodified desire. You need
to turn to other people for help. Collective consciousness
- democratic, open-to-argument, unstable, ungrounded - replaces
individual gratification. The book is a sawn-off shotgun
ablaze with sparks. As Marx wrote to Arnold Ruge in September
1843:
We shall not say: Abandon your struggles, they are mere
folly; let us provide you with the true campaign slogans.
Instead we shall simply show the world why it is struggling,
and consciousness of this is a thing it must acquire whether
it wishes it or not.
This is a programme for revolutionary actions. Whether
they should be called 'art' or 'politics', I don't know.
I suspect the reason for this indecision is that most of
the art and politics we get to see is just another communiqué
from the commodity delusion.
Notes
'The criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all
criticism' ['A Contribution To The Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy
Of Right. Introduction', 1844, Deutsch-Französische
Jahrbücher; translated Rodney Livingstone and Gregor
Benton, Early Writings, London: Penguin, 1975, p. 243]
See preface to Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution
II: the Politics of Social Classes (New York: Monthly Review,
1978).
Karl Marx, Capital, 1867, translated Samuel Moore and Edward
Aveling, NY: Modern Library, 1906, p. 41.
Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse On Coining The New Money Lighter,
In Answer To Mr Locke's `Considerations About Raising the
Value of Money', London: Printed for Richard Chiswell, at
the Rose and Crown in St Paul's Church Yard, 1696, p. 3
(quoted in Marx, Op. Cit., p. 42, n. 1).
Ibid.
Karl Marx, Letter to Arnold Ruge, September 1843; Early
Writings, Penguin: London, 1975, pp. 208-9.
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